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CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT:
THE NEW MEXICO EXPERIENCE
MURIEL McCLELLAND* AND LYNN CIANCI EBY**

In 1974 Congress amended the Social Security Act to create a
uniform scheme of child support enforcement.' The 1974 amendments were more comprehensive than any previous national child
support legislation in that Congress provided for enforcement of
child support obligations due both recipients and non-recipients of
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) funds. This article
will trace the history of federal legislation in the area of child support enforcement, assess child support enforcement in New Mexico
in light of the 1974 amendments, and suggest legislative and program
changes aimed at more effective enforcement of child support obligations in this state.
HISTORY OF FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT LEGISLATION

Congress as early as 1950 attempted to deal with the problem of
absent parents who had a duty to support children on AFDC rolls.2
In that year an amendment providing for "Notice to Law Enforcement Officials" (hereinafter, NOLEO) was added to the Social
Security Act. The amendment provided that each state AFDC plan
"provide for prompt notice to appropriate law enforcement officials
of the furnishing of aid to families with dependent children in
respect of a child who has been deserted or abandoned by a parent." 3 This notice provision never accomplished its goal of liaising
*Special Assistant Attorney General, Department of Human Services, State of New
Mexico; J.D., Temple University School of Law; Member, New Mexico Bar.
**J.D., University of New Mexico School of Law; Member, New Mexico Bar.

1. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, Part B, 88 Stat. 2337
(1974).
2. The term "absent parent" is, in the vast majority of cases, a sex-neutral euphemism for
an absent father, just as the term "family" in the phrase "aid to families with dependent

children" will usually refer to a woman and her children.
3. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Ch. 809 § 321(b), 64 Stat. 549, as
amended 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1 1) (1970). This section was amended recently to read: "...
provide for prompt notice (including the transmittal of all relevant information) to the State
child support collection agency (established pursuant to part D of this Title) of the furnishing of aid to families with dependent children with respect to a child who has been
deserted or abandoned by a parent (including a child born out of wedlock without regard to
whether the paternity of such child has been established) ...." Social Security Act

Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(11) (Supp. 1978). See also 45 CFR § 235.70 (1977),
which defines "prompt notice" as "[w] ritten notice within two working days of the furnishing of aid."
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local welfare departments and local law enforcement agencies for
purposes of enforcing a duty to support. As a result, the NOLEO
provisions of the Social Security Act came under heavy criticism as
mere words on paper.
To correct the failings of the earlier NOLEO provisions, Congress
passed the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act which
allowed for the allocation of federal funds for child support enforcement.4 The Senate Report of these amendments included the following rationale for the proposed changes:
A substantial proportion of the persons receiving aid under the
AFDC program are eligible because of the desertion by a parent of
the child. Several provisions are already in the law and more are
proposed under the bill to provide additional tools to States and to
impose further obligations on them to assure the determination of
legal responsibility for support and to make efforts to make these
collections. The committee believes it is essential to make certain
that all legally responsible parents of sufficient means 5make their
appropriate contribution to the support of their children.
The 1967 amendments provided that a "single organizational
unit" be established in the state agency administering the state
AFDC plan and in each political subdivision, which would be specifically responsible for developing and implementing a child support
enforcement program. 6 Reciprocal arrangements with other states to
7
obtain or enforce support orders were specifically endorsed. The
amendments also provided access to Social Security and Internal
Revenue Service records to locate absent parents.8
The 1967 amendments generally met with not much more than
paper compliance by the states and, therefore, did not result in effec9
tive enforcement of child support obligations. As a result, the
amendments to the Social Security Act which were enacted in 1974
addressed two problems. The first objective accomplished by the
1974 legislation was to invalidate a growing body of case law which
4. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 201, 81 Stat. 821 (1967)
(codified in 42 U.S.C.).
5. S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1967), reprinted in [19671 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News, 2997.
6. Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 201(a)(1)(c), 81 Stat. 821 (1967) (repealed by Pub. L. 93-647,
§ 101(c)(8), 88 Stat. 2360 (1975)).
7. Id.
8. Pub. L. No. 90-248, tit. I1 § 211(b), 81 Stat. 897 (1967) (repealed by Pub. L. No.
93-647, § 101(c)(8), 88 Stat. 2360 (1975)).
9. [19741 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 8148-49. See also Developments in Welfare
Law-1973 (pts. 1-2), 59 Cornell L. Rev. 859, 875 (1974), 60 Cornell L. Rev. 789, 871-8
(1975).
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held that a state could not make a welfare recipient's eligibility
dependent on complaince with the disclosure provisions of the Social
Security Act.' 0 The second objective of the 1974 revisions was to
provide a uniform, effective statutory scheme for child support
enforcement among the states.
TITLE IV-D OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

The child support amendments of 1974, commonly referred to as
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, were adopted by Congress in
December, 1974, and became effective July 1, 1975.1 1 The anticipated role of the federal government is summarized in the Senate
Report which embodies the legislative history of the 1974 amendments:
The Committee bill includes a number of features designed to assure
an effective program of child support. The Committee bill leaves
basic responsibility for child support and establishment of paternity
to the State but it envisions a far more active role on the part of the
Federal Government in monitoring and evaluating State programs, in
10. Howard, Relative Responsibility in AFDC. Problems Raised by the NOLEO Approach-'Ifat First You Don't Succeed.. .', 9 Urban L. Manual, 203, 210 & n. 27 (1975),
Taylor v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd sub nom. Carleson v. Taylor, 404 U.S.
980 (1971), Meyers v. Juras, 327 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ore.), aff'd404 U.S. 803 (1971), Doe v.
Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. ILL.), summarily aff'd sub nom. Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987
(1971). The plaintiffs in these cases were women denied welfare benefits because they
refused to comply with state laws requiring them to cooperate with the welfare department
in initiating nonsupport actions or establishing paternity. They sued under several theories,
including various constitutional violations. Because federal courts will avoid constitutional
issues when it is possible to decide a case on statutory grounds, none of these cases reached
the constitutional issues. Plaintiffs prevailed in these cases because the courts found that to
condition eligibility for welfare on cooperation imposed a third eligibility requirement,
contrary to the intent of the Social Security Act which stated only two eligibility requirements (that there be needy children, and that they be dependent). Thus, even though Title
IV-D was designed to remove the statutory bar to requiring cooperation as a condition of
eligibility by expressly making it so, the constitutional issues remained. However, constitutional challenges to the requirement of cooperation have been unsuccessful since the change
in the federal law. Brudick v. Miech, 385 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Wisc. 1974) (TRO denied
because plaintiff failed to show likelihood of prevailing on merits where she claimed state
statute requiring disclosure of identity of putative father by unwed mother seeking welfare
benefits was unconstitutional violation of 1st, 5th, 9th and 14th amendments); Doe v.
Morton, 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated 422 U.S. 391 (1975), 414 F. Supp. 1368
(1976) (upheld constitutionality of requiring welfare applicant, as a condition of eligibility,
to cooperate in locating absent parent and establishing paternity and support). See Note,
Civil Liberties versus Governmental Interest: A Constitutional Context for the Impact of
Title I V-D of the Social Security Act on Ohio Families in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program, 5 Capital U.L. Rev. 245 (1976); Note, The 1974 Child Support
Provisions: ConstitutionalRamifications, 6 Capital U.L. Rev. 275 (1976).
11. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Jan. 11, 1975, 9406; [19741 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News, 8133.
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providing technical assistance, and, in certain instances, in undertaking to give direct assistance to the States in locating absent
parents and in obtaining support payments from them.' 2

The authors of the Senate Report correlated the issues of rising
welfare costs and the nonsupport of children by stating that "[tihe
problem of welfare in the United States is, to a considerable extent, a
'
problem of non-support of children by their absent parents."' The
committee which resolved the differences between the House and
Senate proposals, reported that of a total eleven million recipients of
AFDC benefits, four out of five recipients of public assistance had
been deprived the support of a parent.' I More accurately, the problem of non-support of children was narrowed to fathers who declined
to pay child support. The Committee stated that it believed "that all
children have the right to receive support from their fathers. The
Committee bill ...

is designed to help children attain this right,

including the right to have their fathers identified so that support can
be obtained."' '
Stated simply, the legislative purpose of Title IV-D was to pressure
states into enforcing child support orders, particularly where AFDC
beneficiaries were concerned. Since previous attempts to put some
teeth into child support enforcement programs had failed, sponsors
12. S. Rep. No. 93-1356, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1974, reprinted in [19741 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News, 8134.
13. The rate of growth in the number of absent fathers of AFDC children has been
dramatic. The following national statistics showing this growth rate were included in the
Committee's report:
Year
% Absent Fathers in AFDC Families
1961
66.7
1967
74.2
1969
75.4
1971
76.2
1973
80.2
Year
No. of Recipients of AFDC Benefits
(in millions)
1961
2.4
1967
3.9
1969
5.5
1971
7.5
end of June, 1974
8.7
The Senate debate on the amendments in 1974 brought out some interesting statistics on
the extent of noncompliance generally with child support orders in the United States:
nationally, 42% of all support orders are not honored at all, even during the first year; 20%
more are only paid in part. After 10 years, the percentage of noncompliance increases to
79% and an additional 8% also pay less than the ordered amount. 120 Cong. Rec. 21,748
(daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974).
14. S. Rep. No. 93-1356, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1974, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News, 8145.
15. Id. at 8146.
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of the House and Senate bills believed that "new and stronger legislative action is required in this area which will create a mechanism to
require compliance with the law."' 6 Title IV-D of the Social Security Act was unceremoniously born.
To "encourage" the states to act, Congress by Title IV-D provided
both the state and the individual AFDC applicant with dollar incentives for compliance"7 and penalties for noncompliance."8 The
penalties allowed by Congress ultimately involve cutting off federal
welfare funding to a state.' 9 Apparently the threats were potent
enough. Within one year from the effective date of the amendments,
all states, with the exception of Missouri, were in compliance.
Shortly thereafter Missouri also complied.
Although cooperation in identifying an absent parent was made a
condition of the custodial parent's AFDC eligibility, initially money
incentives were also offered to AFDC mothers for naming and
assisting in the location of absent fathers. During the first year of the
program forty percent of the first fifty dollars a month child support
received by a mother would be disregarded for purposes of determining AFDC benefits. 2 0 The applicant is required to "cooperate"
with the state enforcement agency in identifying and locating the
absent parent. Title IV-D further requires the AFDC applicant to
furnish the state or local agency with her and her children's social
security numbers as a condition of eligibility for public assistance. 2 1
The penalty for the adult applicant who fails to cooperate is a denial
of welfare assistance for the adult, with the children receiving "pro2
tective payments" through a caretaker payee. 2
In addition to the penalty and incentive provisions, Title IV-D was
unique in several other respects. Emphasis was placed on the location
of the absent parent. Each state plan had to establish a Parent
Locator Service. If a state locator service was unsuccessful in its
16. Id. at 8149-50.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 658 (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 301.52 (1977).
18. 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(d) (1977).
19. Id. The cut-off of federal funds for welfare programs constituted the most extreme
penalty. If a state plan is not in conformance with minimum federal standards, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare can impose a penalty equal to 5% of the federal
funds allocated to a state's AFDC program. [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 8151; 45
CFR § 205.146(d) (1977).
20. Id. at 8157; 45 C.F.R. § 232.12 (1977).
21. Social Security Act, Pub. L. 93-647, § 101(c)(5)(C) (1975); 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(25),
as amended 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (1976); 45 CFR § 232.10 (1977). See Chambers v.
Klein, 419 F. Supp. 569 (D.N.J. 1976), aff'd 564 F.2d 89 (1977), which upheld the
constitutionality of the requirement that social security numbers be obtained and furnished
for children receiving AFDC benefits against a claim that it violated the constitutional right
to privacy of children and parents.
22. 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(e) (1977).
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efforts to locate an absent parent, a state could resort to the newlycreated Federal Parent Locator Service. This service would have
access to the files of all federal agencies (including HEW and IRS
files) to facilitate location efforts. 3
Title IV-D also required a separate organizational unit for child
support enforcement, as had earlier child support legislation. To
encourage prosecution, the 1974 amendments envisioned child
support units located in a local district attorney's or attorney general's office, although it was left to the option of each state whether
to continue to have the unit located in the welfare agency, as previously required, or to establish the unit outside of the welfare
agency. 2 1 In order to aid the state agencies, the 1974 amendments
provided that federal matching funds be increased to seventy-five
percent for administrative costs specifically incurred to locate absent
parents and to enforce support orders. 2 s
The mechanism which permits a state to sue in its own name for
child support is the "assignment" procedure. Federal regulations
mandate that the state plan provide, as a condition of eligibility for
AFDC benefits, that each AFDC applicant or recipient assign to the
state any rights to child support that person may have at the time the
assignment is made, unless there is a state law which would accomplish the same end. 2 6 The regulations specify that the assignment be
23. At first glance, the provision seems to conflict with the confidentiality provisions of
public welfare and other government agency records. The Committee report explained the
Committee's view favoring disclosure of information:
The current regulations are based on a provision in the Social Security Act
which since 1939 has required State programs of Aid to Families with Dependent Children to 'provide safeguards which restrict the use of disclosure of
information concerning applicants and recipients to purposes directly connected with the administration of Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
This provision was designed to prevent harassment of welfare recipients. The
Committee bill would make it clear that this requirement may not be used to
prevent a court, prosecuting attorney, tax authority, law enforcement officer,
legislative body, or other public official from obtaining information required
in connection with his official duties such as obtaining support payments or
prosecuting fraud or other criminal or civil violations.
[19741 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 8152.
24. [19741 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 8157; 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (Supp. 1978); 45
C.F.R. § 302.12(a) (1977).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 304.20 (1977).
26. 45 C.F.R. § 232.11 (1977). This section states in pertinent part:
(a) The State plan must provide that:
(1) As a condition of eligibility for assistance, each applicant for or recipient
of AFDC shall assign to the State any rights to support from any other person
as such applicant or recipient may have:
(i) In his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom the
applicant or recipient is applying for or receiving assistance; and
(ii) Which have accrued at the time such assignment is executed.
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made for all child support due and owing at the time the assignment
is made. This procedure allows the state child support agency to seek
not only reimbursement of its own expenditures, but also, on behalf
of the welfare client, any previous child support payments owed an
AFDC recipient. Noncompliance with the assignment provisions
results in removal of the adult, but not the children, from the AFDC
grant.2 7 The regulations also specify that if an AFDC applicant
refuses to assign her support rights to the state, the state may still
proceed to establish paternity and collect child support pursuant to
2

state law.

8

In addition to provisions directed to the collection of child support and establishment of paternity for AFDC recipients, the 1974
amendments to the Social Security Act mandated support enforcement for non-welfare families. In non-welfare cases, when a client
applies for child support enforcement services, the state may charge a
reasonable flat application fee not to exceed twenty dollars or may
establish an application fee schedule based on income. The fee
schedule is to be designed "so as not to discourage the application
for such services by those most in need of them. ' 2 9 The state plan
may also provide for recovery of costs incurred in addition to the
application fee. 3" In keeping with the intent to reduce the numbers
of families on welfare rolls by enforcing child support orders against
absent parents, the intent to discourage families from getting on
welfare rolls in the first place must be read into this provision. 3 '
27. 45 C.F.R. § 232.11(a)(2) (1977); 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(b)(4)(i) (1977); [19741 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News, 8152-53.
28. 45 C.F.R. § 232.11(c) (1977); [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 8152-53.
29. 45 C.F.R. § 302.33(b) (1977). In New Mexico a flat $20.00 application fee is
charged.
30. 45 C.F.R. § 302.33(c) (1977). The New Mexico costs schedule is as follows: location
of absent parent $68.00; establishment of paternity and establishment of court-ordered
support obligation $145.00; establishment of support obligation $70.00; enforcement of a
support obligation $40.00. These costs are deducted from any recovery, but no more than
20% can be deducted from any monthly payment. New Mexico Child Support Enforcement
Bureau Fee Schedule, effective as of July 1, 1977.
31. In deference to the poor, the Committee acknowledged that the affluent are also
guilty of non-support. [19741 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 8147-48. The Committee
relied upon a Rand Corporation study for this assessment (Winston and Forsher, "Nonsupport of Legitimate Children by Affluent Fathers as a Cause of Poverty and Welfare
Dependence," December, 1971), which speculated that middle-class women went on welfare
specifically to enforce child support agreements under a divorce or separation decree:
"During the years 1961 to 1968, middle-class women appeared on the AFDC rolls in large
enough numbers to raise the average educational and occupational levels of recipients. They
became eligible for aid when prevented from working by serious problems-and they somehow managed, while still eligible, to go off the rolls at twice their proportion in the active
caseload. How many went on welfare to obtain enforcement of child support orders?"
[1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 8148.
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As with AFDC cases, states are also obligated to establish support
orders and paternity in non-welfare cases. The state IV-D agency may
take an assignment of support rights from a non-AFDC applicant for
paternity or child support services. Unlike AFDC cases, however,
such an assignment may not be a condition for the receipt of such
services." 2
The enforcement remedies specifically enumerated by the federal
regulations include contempt proceedings, garnishment of wages, and
3
For the
attachment of property when sanctioned by state law.
first time, federal employees, including military personnel, are not
held exempt from child support enforcement by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Title IV-D provides for attachment and garnishment of federal salaries when child support obligations are evaded. "
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (hereinafter, URESA), a model statute passed in its original form by Congress in 1953 and effecting interstate child support enforcement in
3
all states, the territories of Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands and Guam, I
was not usurped by Title IV-D. On the contrary, states are mandated
enforce supto cooperate in assisting other states in their efforts 3 to
6
processes.
legal
other
or
URESA
through
port orders
The 1974 amendments to the Social Security Act represent a
comprehensive statutory scheme to enforce and establish, uniformly
throughout the nation, child support orders through the use of
existing state remedies and compulsory and noncompulsory assignment of support rights, in an effort to lessen the taxpayer burden.
The question remains whether federal intervention has been successful in legislating, if not morality, then at least familial responsibility,
in an area previously relegated almost exclusively to the private
sector. For purposes of this assessment, the New Mexico child support experience will be reviewed in depth.
NEW MEXICO STATUTES PROVIDING FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT
The duty of a parent to support his minor child was no more than
a moral obligation at early common law. A parental duty of support
eventually was recognized in the law as a continuing duty, unless a
32. 45 C.F.R. § § 302.33, 303.4, 303.5 (1977).

33. 45 C.F.R. § 303.6 (1977).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1976).
35. URESA is also in effect in some parts of Canada. See generally W. Brockelbank,
Interstate Enforcement of Family Support (The Runaway Pappy Act) (1960).
36. Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ § 40-6-1 to 41 (1978); 45 C.F.R. § 303.7 (1977).
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parent was legally relieved from performing that duty.3 Also recognized was the right of third parties to reimbursement for providing
support to an individual where the legal duty rested with another. 3 8
Even prior to the enactment of Title IV-D, New Mexico as well as
most states recognized the duty of support and the right to sue to
enforce a child support obligation. In New Mexico, the parental duty
of support is established under the Parentage Act and is applicable to
both a mother and a father of a minor child. 3 9 The third party right
to sue is codified in New Mexico as follows:
'7

The obligation of the father or mother creates also a cause of action
on behalf of their legal representatives or on behalf of third parties
furnishing support or defraying the expenses thereof where parentage has been judicially established, or where parentage has been
acknowledged
in writing or by the part performance of the parental
4 0
obligations.

The Department of Human Services (formerly the Health and
Social Services Department) of the State of New Mexico, which is
responsible for administration of the state's welfare program and,
more recently, for the implementation of New Mexico's state plan
under Title IV-D, has been permitted since 1965 to sue in its own
name for welfare expenditures on behalf of children. The applicable
statute provides:
Action.-When a spouse or minor children are recipients of public
assistance, the department may bring an action in its own name
against the person responsible for the support of such recipients:
A. to recover amounts expended by the department on behalf of
said recipients or such amounts as may be due and owing under an
existing court order, whichever is less: and
B. for a continuing order of support for the benefit of such
recipients. 4

In addition to these statutes, New Mexico adopted
the Uniform
4
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA). 2
37. For an historical discussion of the child's right to support see Greenspan v. Slate, 12
N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953). See also N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 40-4-7, 40-6-9 (1978); Fevig v.
Fevig, 90 N.M. 51, 559 P.2d 839 (1977); Mason v. Mason, 84 N.M. 720, 507 P.2d 781
(1973); State ex rel. Terry v. Terry, 80 N.M. 185, 453 P.2d 206 (1969); Wilson v. Wilson, 45
N.M. 224, 114 P.2d 737 (1941).
38. Locker, Enforcement of Child Support Obligations of Absent Parents-SocialSer-

vices Amendments of 1974, 30 So. Western L.J. 625, n. 17 (1976).
39. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 40-5-1 to 25 (1978).
40. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-5-4 (1978).
41. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 27-2-28 (1978).
42. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 40-6-1 to 41 (1978).
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The Office of the District Attorney originally was charged with
the enforcement of support orders.4" The New Mexico experience
prior to the passage of Title IV-D was that child support was given
the lowest priority of all categories of cases in the district attorney's
office and, consequently, the state statutes simply were not, or were
at best feebly, enforced. 4 4 This experience of lack of enforcement
led to federal intervenwas mirrored in the majority of the states and
4
tion in the form of the 1974 amendments. 5
In New Mexico, as in other states, individuals seeking to enforce or
establish child support orders always had recourse to the private legal
sector which could invoke the continuing jurisdiction of the district
court in a divorce action to modify support orders and institute
contempt proceedings. Title IV-D has left this avenue of child support enforcement open to all. The state is nonetheless entitled to
reimbursement of any AFDC child support expenditures from the
absent parent and, hence, may seek to intervene as a real party in
interest in a divorce action. 4 6
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT IN NEW MEXICO SINCE TITLE IV-D
Child support enforcement in New Mexico changed radically upon
enactment of Title IV-D. The statute required the creation of "a
single and separate organizational unit" to administer the state's plan
for child support.4 7 In order to fulfill the federal requirement, the
New Mexico Child Support Enforcement Division was established in
June, 1975 by Governor's Executive Order. 4 8 Subsequently, the
name of this unit was changed to the Child Support Enforcement
Bureau (hereinafter, CSEB).
The New Mexico CSEB is essentially a legal services program
which employs approximately sixty-seven people statewide, six of
whom are attorneys. The state is divided into six regions. Investigators who function as paralegals do the preparatory work when a case
43. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 27-2-29 (1978); N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 40-6-1 to 41 (1978).
44. A small percentage of non-AFDC cases is currently still handled by the District
Attorney's Office (those applicants who either do not or cannot pay the CSEB costs and
application fee). The vast majority of cases go through the Department of Human Services
Child Support Enforcement Bureau (CSEB).
45. [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 8148.
46. The state, under the assignment provisions in the federal regulations, 45 C.F.R.
§ 232.11 (1977), may sue for all child support due and owing. Under N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 27-2-28 (1978), the state is entitled only to amounts it has actually paid out for the
support of welfare recipients who are minors. Should the court enforce a child support
order in excess of amounts actually expended in welfare benefits, the excess is turned over
to the welfare client and is counted as income.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 654(3) (1976).
48. Governor's Executive Order No. 75-23, June 16, 1975.
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is referred to CSEB from the local welfare office or when a nonwelfare client seeks CSEB services. The investigators attempt to
locate absent parents, compute the amount of support owed to the
state by each absent parent, and do most of the work needed to
prepare a case for court, including preparation of legal pleadings. The
case then becomes the responsibility of a CSEB attorney who takes
appropriate legal action to obtain child support payments.
The type of legal service provided by CSEB depends on the type
of non-support case presented. If the non-support case involves an
AFDC recipient the state automatically seeks reimbursement of
benefits paid to a welfare client on behalf of minor children whether
the client requests it or not. In non-AFDC cases, CSEB seeks child
support payments only when a client wishing to recover child support payments owed her applies directly for the CSEB service.
The AFDC recipient is interviewed by a Department of Human
Services (DHS) caseworker at the local welfare office upon initial
application for benefits. Relevant information regarding an absent
parent, and copies of the divorce decree, paternity acknowledgment
and support orders, if any, are sent directly to the CSEB regional
office. This information is then forwarded to Santa Fe so that this
data can be recorded on the computer for purposes of location,
billing, and later enforcement efforts. At the regional office, the
application is processed by an investigator for eventual legal action.
If the AFDC applicant has been on welfare before, arrearages owed
to the state covering all the time the applicant has been on welfare
must be computed. Where the welfare history is long and complicated, this is a difficult task because the information is not centralized and record-keeping has not been standardized. The time period
between the initial interview in the welfare office to the filing of a
complaint has been reduced to a month in most cases.
The non-AFDC client, on the other hand, must request the services of CSEB before CSEB will take any action to begin child
support enforcement proceedings. In New Mexico this type of client
pays a $20.00 application fee, signs a contract with CSEB assigning
to the state the right to collect child support, and agrees to pay for
services provided according to a fee schedule. Investigators process
these cases in essentially the same manner as welfare cases.
Once a file in either the AFDC or the non-welfare category is
opened, it must then be determined judicially that there is an obligation of support owed by the non-custodial parent. If there is a
divorce decree and a support order, the obligation has already been
established. Paternity suits are brought in cases where paternity has
not yet been acknowledged. Where paternity is not in question, but a

NEW MEXICO LA WREVIEW

(Vol. 9

support order does not exist, DHS may file a non-support suit to
obtain a support order whether or not a divorce has taken place.
LOCAL & OUT-OF-STATE ENFORCEMENT
A local case is one in which the absent parent and the custodial
parent reside within the same judicial district. A non-local case is one
in which the absent parent resides outside of the jurisdiction.
Depending on the domicile of the absent parent and on whether the
case is an AFDC non-support suit or a non-welfare case, different
legal avenues will be taken to ensure enforcement.
In the case of a local AFDC applicant and a local absent parent,
the state files a complaint in its own name suing for reimbursement
of expenses paid out to welfare recipients to whom support is owed
by the non-custodial parent. Two legal theories are used. One is that
both a state statute4 9 and federal regulations 5 0 authorize such a suit
on behalf of the state on the theory that the state is the real party in
interest. An assignment theory is also argued since the welfare
applicant must assign her rights to support payments as a condition
of eligibility.' ' In New Mexico, apart from the initial interview at
the welfare office, the welfare recipient usually does not participate
in the legal process at any point in a non-support suit, although her
obligation to "cooperate" includes appearing as a witness in court or
in other proceedings necessary to determine paternity or collect
support., 2
In a local non-welfare case, an Order to Show Cause in the original
divorce decree represents the usual legal route to enforcement, based
upon the Court's continuing jurisdiction in divorce, custody, and
support matters.5 " Theoretically, CSEB may also sue on the theory
that the rights to collect child support payments have been assigned
to CSEB by the contract entered into with the agency by the
client.5 4 This theory has proven more cumbersome than the Order
to Show Cause procedure and is frequently contested.
For the out-of-state cases, and intra-state cases that are not local
(i.e. within the same county), authorization for the state to initiate a
suit to enforce a child support obligation is provided by URESA." s
49. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 27-2-28 (1978).
50. 45 C.F.R. § 302.50 (1977).
51. 45 C.F.R. § 232.11 (1977); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A) (1976).
52. 43 Fed. Reg. 2176 (1978) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 232.12).
53. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-5 (1978).
54. 45 C.F.R. § 303.6 (1977).
55. Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, N.M.
§ § 40-6-1 to 41 (1978).

Stat. Ann.
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also specifically authorize the use of URESA for
Federal regulations
5
this purpose. 6
For local cases, paternity suits may be brought by the state under
authority provided by the New Mexico Parentage Act' ' and the
federal regulations' 8 while non-local cases are prosecuted under
URESA.5 9 In an AFDC paternity suit, the New Mexico statute
permits both mother and putative father to be named as codefendants. 6 0 The two-year statute of limitations in paternity suits
does not apply to paternity suits brought by the state. 6 1 While the
federal regulations do not permit setting priorities for prosecution of
the various types of child support actions which an enforcement unit
takes, the complexity and cost involved in prosecuting a contested
paternity action for both an AFDC recipient and a non-welfare client
effectively results in these cases receiving the lowest priority in the
New Mexico CSEB program.
Defenses to AFDC non-support and paternity actions include the
denial of paternity, or the claim that payments have been made by
the absent parent and have not been reported to the welfare agency.
Usually, if arrearages have been accurately computed, the state is in
the position of presenting a prima facie case of non-support. In an
AFDC case, the amount of the award may vary: it may represent
reimbursement to the Department of Human Services for amounts
actually expended as a third party, or it may reflect the amount of
support ordered in the divorce decree. In either case the custodial
parent is entitled to any amounts collected in excess of what the
state has actually expended for the support of minor children (which
at the present time is sixty-nine dollars per month per child). This
amount is then computed as "income" to the recipient in the determination of the AFDC grant.
Defenses to the non-welfare non-support and paternity actions
brought by the state on behalf of the non-AFDC recipient are the
same as the AFDC defenses: the denial of paternity, or that payments have been made and no support is owed. In addition, there is
the usual panoply of hardship "defenses" to non-support allegations.
This latter group of defenses includes claims that there are changes in
circumstances, that support orders are too high, that other respon56. 45 C.F.R. § 303.7 (1977).
57. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-5-1 (1978).
58. 45 C.F.R. § 303.5 (1977).
59. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 40-6-1 to 41 (1978).
60. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-5-7 (1978).
61. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-5-23 (1978). In a recent decision, Stringer v. Dudoich, 92 N.M.
98, 583 P.2d 462 (1978), this statute was held unconstitutional to the extent that it
precluded an action to determine paternity brought by an illegitimate child.
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sibilities exist, that there has been a remarriage of either parent, and
that visitation rights are being denied. Unless there is a showing of a
bona fide change of cicumstances, as legally defined, these "defenses" are usually unsuccessful.
CSEB attempts to work out stipulated agreements with respondents. If the case is taken to court, and this is done only as a last
resort, CSEB's enforcement of a support order is usually predicated
upon numerous forays into the judicial system. In the final analysis,
therefore, the efficacy of child support enforcement in the state of
New Mexico rests with the response of the judicial system. Once a
non-support case gets to court, enforcement of support orders falls
to the peculiar ideology of individual district judges. Results in enforcement proceedings vary widely throughout the state and even
within a judicial district.6 2 Predictably, judicial attitudes with respect to the enforcement of child support orders also vary widely,
ranging from nonenforcement to jailing for civil contempt. 6 3
One end of the continuum is represented by the judicial attitude
that if a mother is on welfare an order for child support in the
divorce decree is inappropriate and unnecessary. This attitude is
directly contrary to the intent of federal legislation which initiated
the national child support enforcement program. It is also contrary
to New Mexico law which states that the court shall not consider
present or future welfare payments in determining child support. 6 4
Another, more common, attitude held by some judges is that a man
should be given every opportunity to pay child support which is
owed without using legal sanctions against him. The justification for
this attitude is the same as that which has supported theories of
interspousal and interfamilial immunity: to wit, the sanctity of the
family. This attitude sometimes results in holding a judgment for
arrears in abeyance as long as the nonsupporting parent keeps current
on present payments. In effect, the mother is estopped from
pursuing a garnishment remedy for past due payments even if the
criteria for garnishment are present. Other judges demonstrate a
similar concern for the man by reducing the child support obligation
to as low as ten dollars a month, especially if the woman is receiving
AFDC. Some judges sympathize with the "second family" of a nonsupporting father to the detriment of the "first family." If a man is
supporting a new family, some judges will tend to be less strict in
62. Interview with Carrell Ray, Chief Attorney, New Mexico CSEB, On June 20, 1978.
63. In November, 1977 the then student co-author of this article interviewed a number
of district judges known to represent a cross-section of judicial attitudes toward enforcement of child support.
64. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-11 (1978).
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their enforcement orders, with full knowledge that the primary duty
under the law is to the "first family." Such lax judicial attitudes
towards child support enforcement result in higher rates of delinquency in nonpayment.
The ultimate sanction for willful nonpayment is, of course, jailing
for contempt of court, a judicial response which represents the
opposite end of the enforcement continuum. The contemnor, in
effect, holds the keys to a jail in his pocket-payment is his release.
Job disruption is usually cited as a reason not to use jailing, but upon
examination this rationale is weak. Unusual circumstances aside, an
employed father is able to pay child support if he is so motivated.
Experience shows he is also capable of paying the amount necessary
to avoid being jailed. Most men ordered to jail for civil contempt pay
the money within hours or days after jailing.6 s Then there is also the
alternative of "work-release" or "week-end jail" which would allow a
contemner to continue his employment.
A second reason cited for not using the judicial contempt power is
that county jails are overcrowded and space should not be taken up
by the noncriminal defendant. 6 6 A Michigan study, however, shows
that men jailed for contempt are rarely jailed for more than a few
hours or a couple of days at most.6 7 Jailing persons for contempt,
therefore, would not cause an unbearable burden on the jails' population problem. The experience in New Mexico supports the findings
of the Michigan study.6 8 Two district judges in Bernalillo County
consistently jail for failure to pay child support. In Valencia and
Sandoval counties, jailing is the norm. And, consistent with Chambers' findings on the effects of jailing for nonsupport in Michigan,
the results of jailing can be heralded. 6 9
65. Interview with Carrell Ray, supra note 62.
66. Supra note 63.
67. Chambers, Men Who Know They Are Watched: Some Benefits and Costs of Jailing
for Nonpayment of Support, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 900 (1977).
68. Id.
69. Interview with Carrell Ray, supra, note 62. The experience with Bernalillo County
URESA cases supports this conclusion. At the present time, a Special Master hears URESA
petitions from initiating out-of-state jurisdictions directed against Bernalillo County
obligors. Payments are made directly to the Support Payments Section of the District Court.
Since the Special Master does not have contempt powers, orders to show cause in URESA
cases are heard by District Judge William Riordan, who consistently jails obligors for willful
noncompliance with support orders. Usually the sentence is for thirty (30) days or until
satisfactory arrangements have been made with CSEB. Consistent with the experience of
CSEB attorneys in Valencia and Sandoval counties, the obligor usually manages to come up
with the money in a few days and rarely does it take longer than a week. Collections have
dramatically increased since jailing for contempt has been the rule in URESA cases.
The irony of this situation is that support orders from other states are being strictly
enforced, while support orders which emanate from Bernalillo County are still subject to a
rather inconsistent enforcement policy left to the discretion of the individual district judges.
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More importantly, judicial attitudes against jailing negatively
affect the entire child support enforcement system. If the ultimate
sanction-civil contempt for repeated failure to pay child support-is
rarely and sporadically used, the motivation of fathers to pay, and to
pay every month, is adversely affected. Without effective judicial
enforcement of support obligations the resources of private petitioners and of CSEB necessary to enforce support orders will become
strained beyond accommodation.
EFFECTIVENESS OF NEW MEXICO'S CSEB
Even before the effective date of the 1974 amendments to the
Social Security Act, the effectiveness of the proposed national
enforcement program was assessed in terms of cost-analysis. 7 0 Using
a cost-effectiveness standard the first two years of the New Mexico
child support enforcement program can hardly be deemed a success;
the program was spending more than it was taking in.7 1
By early 1978, this situation was in the process of changing.7 2
The Department of Human Services Quarterly Report, JanuaryMarch, 1978, showed that in the first quarter of the year it cost the
State of New Mexico $1.11 to collect $1.00 in child support.7 3
Reportedly, the state is now collecting more than it spends. Although precise figures are not presently available, accounting procedures have been instituted which will better assess the efficacy of
the CSEB program on a cost-benefit basis. 7 4
Besides cost-effectiveness, other factors should be considered in
the overall assessment of the New Mexico child support enforcement
program. Still not measured is the saving to New Mexico taxpayers in
terms of the numbers of potential long-term AFDC recipients who
either are not applying for welfare benefits because of the child
support enforcement program, or who stay on welfare only short
periods of time because child support is being collected. While a
decline in welfare costs nationally and statewide is felt to be attributable to the program, firm figures which will confirm this effect in
New Mexico have yet to be assembled. 7 s
70. Interview with Carrell Ray, supra, note 62; "Child Support Enforcement: Does It
Really Pay," Paternity and Child Support Workshop, U.S. Department of Health, Education
and Welfare.
71. Interview with Carrell Ray, supra, note 62.
72. Interview with William Chavez, Field Office Manager, Bernalillo County Regional

Office, CSEB, on Sept. 28, 1978.
73.
Social
74.
75.

Quarterly Report, January-March, 1978, Health and Social Services Department,
Welfare Programs.
Interview with William Chavez, supra note 72.
Interview with Carrell Ray, supra, note 62.

Winter 1978-79]

CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT

The New Mexico child support enforcement program was plagued
early on with administrative wrinkles that now seem to have been
ironed out. Most of the problem lay with faulty models used in
setting up the program at the outset. Another failing seemed to be
insufficient number of personnel to do the job. As the program
evolved, emphasis was placed on the number of cases filed in court as
a measure of performance without regard to actual collections; the
program was heavily weighted in the area of administrative, secretarial, and clerical positions when what was needed was a support
system for the legal section. These failings have been corrected. 7 6
The emphasis in the program has shifted. Apparently, it has been
conceded by CSEB administrators that the number of cases filed in
court is a meaningless concept 7 which does not measure progress
towards the eventual goal of the legal action-the collection of child
support payments. All efforts are now directed to this end in the
form of early discovery of delinquency and in initiating garnishment
proceedings and civil contempt actions. Collections are the present
measure of CSEB success.
Legislative changes geared to making child support more effective
in New Mexico have been proposed. Several of the proposals are
specifically designed to facilitate collections; other legislative proposals are aimed at reducing judicial discretion in child support litigation.

8

One legislative proposal is for a statute which would make an
unpaid support obligation a judgment due and owing on the date it is
due. Such a statute would permit an obligee to obtain a writ of
execution or garnishment against an obligor without first going to
court to have the unpaid child support obligation reduced to a
judgment. Probably the most far-reaching change requested of the
legislature is the proposed involuntary wage assignment statute,
which allows an obligee to petition the court for an order providing
for the withholding of child support, including arrearages, from an
obligor's wages upon a showing that required payments are not likely
to be made when due. Several states have provisions for involuntary
wage assignments and the results are generally applauded.7 "
Also proposed is a statute which would require the district court
to provide a hearing to a person to whom a child support obligation
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. The Child Support Enforcement Bill, CSEB, legislative changes proposed for consideration in the 1979 legislative session (September, 1978) (mimeo).
79. Note, Involuntary Wage Assignments: A New Approach for Effective Enforcement of
Support Obligations, 11 Buffalo L. Rev. (1962).
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is owed within thirty days after a request for hearing has been made
unless such a hearing is waived by the obligee. It is also proposed that
support payment guidelines, such as those in force in Bernalillo and
Santa Fe counties, would be adopted by the CSEB to ensure uniform
statewide child support orders. This proposal would end the present
system of disparate support orders throughout the state. Criteria to
be used in determining the amount of a support order have also been
proposed, in conformance with recent decisions of the Supreme
Court of the State of New Mexico. 8" Another legislative proposal
would make it incumbent upon the court to inquire into and make a
specific finding as to whether the minor children are receiving public
assistance.
It is further proposed that the issue of a support obligation be
considered independent of other issues in a divorce matter, such as
visitation rights. There is a legislative proposal to prohibit the court
from entering a support order in a divorce case when there are
minors receiving public assistance unless CSEB has received notice
and a hearing has been set. Finally, a provision to allow the CSEB to
intervene as a real party in interest in support actions involving
AFDC recipients has also been suggested.
The above recommended statutory changes, if enacted by the
legislature, would cure the defects affecting the child support enforcement program in New Mexico at the present time. Most of the
suggested changes in the law are directed towards limiting- judicial
discretion. Apart from developing a self-effecting system of child
support enforcement and collection, such as that in effect in Michigan, 8 1 the "cure" for the New Mexico program is in terms of getting
the New Mexico judiciary to enforce its own support orders. CSEB's
legislative proposals are directed towards this end.
80. Spingola v. Spingola, 91 N.M. 737, 580 P.2d 958 (1978); Barela v. Barela, 91 N.M.
686, 579 P.2d 1253 (1978).
81. In Michigan, a Friend of the Court system has been employed by statutory mandate
since 1921 in all cases of divorce, separate maintenance and paternity. In these cases the
Friend of the Court agency handles all aspects of child support, from gathering financial
information about the family and advising the judge on the size of the support order, to
collecting and disbursing the money, and finally to enforcement when non-payment occurs.
The system allows for immediate administrative action when a payment is missed rather
than depending on individual complaints through the judicial system. This is true for welfare
and non-welfare cases alike.
Enforcement takes different forms in the different Michigan counties, but in all, warning
letters are sent to delinquent fathers, followed by orders to show cause to explain the
delinquency. Further collection efforts are employed in most counties before jailing is
utilized, but jailing for contempt is relied upon freely as a last resort. The conclusion by the
author of a comprehensive study of the Michigan child support system is that jailing significantly increases collections if accompanied by a well-organized administrative system of
collection. Chambers, supra note 67.
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As discussed above, judicial attitudes towards enforcement are a
hindrance to CSEB's program effectiveness. Judicial practices must
be consonant with the intent and purposes of the federal legislation
on child support enforcement. Specifically, the full range of judicial
sanctions must be used by a judiciary committed to enforcement.
This full use of judicial sanctions would not only benefit CSEB in
recouping money for the state's welfare expenditures, but would also
benefit the many private petitioners who need their support payments to keep their families off welfare. Use of the judicial contempt
power could also benefit the judicial system by reducing the number
of settings on the court docket through minimization of repeat court
appearances in support enforcement cases. It is urged that the legislature pass the proposed measures reducing judicial discretion in these
matters, and that judges rethink their commitment to the support
enforcement efforts of public and private petitioners in this state and
employ the powers vested in them to effectuate those efforts more
consistently.

